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HSEC RUNNER-UP: Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: Eliminating Racial Inequities in the Justice System


“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”[1] Racism in the justice system is unacceptable. It compromises democracy, undermines the Constitution, and encourages racial discrimination in every other walk of life. Yet, until 2017, racially discriminatory statements made by jurors during deliberations could not be released under the no-impeachment rule. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado [2] changed this for the better.

In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,[3] Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez was convicted of sexual harassment and misconduct, then sentenced to two years of probation and required to register as a sexual predator. He promptly submitted a motion for a new trial upon receiving two jurors’ affidavits, which recorded racially discriminatory remarks another juror made against the defendant. The motion was denied by the trial court, and its decision was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court under Rule 606(b), which prevents jurors from disclosing any element of the deliberation. It was also justified under Tanner v. United States,[4] and Warger v. Shauers,[5] which upheld Rule 606(b) and stated that, in the case of a partial jury, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, as the counsel failed to sufficiently exercise voir dire.

On March 6, 2017, in a 5-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and remanded the case for further consideration. In Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, the primary reason given was to combat the systematic infiltration of racial biases into the justice system, by clearly establishing racial animus as an exception to the no-impeachment rule. Justice Kennedy expressed this idea when he stated, “The Court now seeks to strengthen the broader principle that society can and must move forward by achieving the thoughtful, rational dialogue at the foundation of both the jury system and the free society that sustains our Constitution.”[6]

I strongly agree with the decision. First, a petitioner’s motion must be granted when a juror’s bias may have significantly impacted the verdict. In the two jurors’ affidavits, the juror H.C. made several overtly racist remarks, in which he dismissed the petitioner’s alibi because the petitioner was “‘an illegal.’”[7] The juror further stated that he ‘believed the defendant was guilty because … Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe that they could do whatever they wanted with women . . . nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls . . . I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”[8] H.C.’s statements unequivocally show that his prejudices were not only the driving factor behind his decision, but also had the potential to persuade others of the petitioner’s guilt.

Second, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right to an “impartial jury.”[9] In this trial, the defendant’s right was clearly violated, despite the Colorado Supreme Court’s claims. The Court cited Warger as precedent, which held that “even if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties’ ability to bring to the court’s attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered.”[10] However, despite the defense counsel’s thorough questioning throughout the case, no evidence of biases prior to the affidavits surfaced.[11] Moreover, Warger detailed the exception of a “juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.”[12] There is insufficient evidence that the defense counsel did not effectively use voir dire to justify the violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

While precedents such as Tanner and Warger may have upheld Rule 606(b), this case differs in the type of bias. In previous cases, juror concerns pertained to alcohol and drug abuse, and jurors sharing personal tragedies which related to the case. These concerns do not systematically interfere with verdicts. But racial prejudices do. For example, according to the United States Department of Justice, in the 1980s, African Americans and Caucasians had the same rates of misdemeanors, yet 4% more Caucasians convicted of misdemeanors were sentenced to probation than African Americans.[13] Another example is presented in the majority opinion: “‘just in the years 1865 and 1866, all-white juries in Texas decided a total of 500 prosecutions of white defendants charged with killing African-Americans.; All 500 were acquitted.”[14] When confronted with the historical facts, it is apparent that racial disparities in the justice system poses a threat to the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Part of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado’s significance is in establishing, for the first time, a consistent procedure to confront racial animus by jurors during deliberations. In Powers v. Ohio,[15] Rose v. Mitchell,[16] Strauder v. West Virginia,[17] etc.,[18] it was established that the defendant has the right to the “protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.”[19] However, in several other cases the definition of racially discriminatory juries, which qualified as an exception to the no-impeachment rule, varied from having one-biased juror, to a prejudiced influence spreading to all jurors. A source of inconsistency has been the Iowa Rule,[20] which is lenient on exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, permitting testimony on objective matters. Therefore, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado set an important precedent. Already, it has been invoked in Tharpe v. Sellers.[21]

While it is a concern that verdicts may lose legitimacy under the revelations of deliberations, precautions remain in place. Clear procedures safeguard jurors’ rights to evade excessive questioning during the trial. Subjective matters remain confidential under the no-impeachment rule. The Supreme Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado -- that overtly racist remarks qualify as an exception to the Sixth Amendment -- is critical. This is one small step towards a world where antipathy cannot decide what reason must. Where defendants cannot be convicted by the color of their skin. Where dreams of equity cannot die and glaring racial discrimination by jurors will be looked in the eye.

[1] Martin Luther King Jr.

[2] 580 U.S. ___ (2017).

[3] 350 P. 3d 287 (2015).

[4] 483 U. S. 107 (1987).

[5] 574 U. S. ___ (2014).

[6] Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S.__ at 21.

[7] Id. at 4.

[8] Ibid, 3-4.

[9] U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

[10] Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S.__ at 12 (quoting Warger 574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10)).

[11] Prior to the selection of the panel, the jurors were asked whether there was “anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror.” This question was repeated several times, and the jurors were finally asked whether “this is simply not a good case [for them].” Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S.__ at 2.

[12] Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S.__ at 12 (quoting Warger 574 U. S., at ___–___, n. 3 (slip op., at 10–11, n. 3)).

[13] Joan Petersilia. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System (June 1983), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/127137NCJRS.pdf

[14] Peña-Rodriguez, 580 U.S.__ at 14.

[15] 499 U. S. 400 (1991).

[16] 443 U. S. 545 (1979).

[17] 100 U. S. 303 (1880).

[18] Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S. 182; Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28 (1986).

[19] Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.

[20] The Iowa Rule has been a historical source of confusion, as it was permitted in United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361 and Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140. However, it was later rejected in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, as concerns arose that the legitimacy of any verdict could be questioned. The Federal Rule 606(b) was then established to reduce exceptions to the no-impeachment rule.

[21] A juror voted for African American Keith Tharpe’s guilt and stated “[a]fter studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have souls.” 583 U. S. __ (2018). Tharpe is currently on death row. The Supreme Court has remanded the case for further consideration of whether Tharpe should be granted a Certificate of Appealability.


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